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«o special report i a. 3 E by Jean-Marc Brun Spectrum Stuff Writer ‘The greatest crisis of Jimmy Carter’s presidency.’ That’s whatthe news media has been calling the Iranian student attack on the American embassy in Teheran and its resultant tensions. The students say they will not release the 62 American hostages until the U.S. surrenders Shah Reza Pahlevi who is undergoing treatment for lymphatic cancer at a New York hospital. The U.S. has refused to capitulate to the hostage blackmail and finds itself in a highly frustrating situation, one where it is forced to deal with an intractable mob and a power diffused government. The storming of the U.S. Embassy on the morning of November 4 was the result of a forewarned retaliatory move against President Carter’s decision to allow the Shah to enter this country for proper medical treatment. State Department specialists warned that the Shah’s entry might provoke the kind of response that did ensue. And Iran’s legislative body, the revolutionary council, issued some not-so-veiied threats, threats that were echoed in Washington by the Iranian embassy. The move by the students to take over the Embassy was condoned, if not actually ordered, by Iran’s de facto leader the Ayatollah Khomeini who called the Embassy “a nest of spies” and “a center of intrigue.” Hostages remain captive at mission Second rate power The inability of the United States, the greatest of the superpowers with its enormous nuclear capacities to effectively deal a mob of students from a second-rate world power reaffirms the feelings of national weakness and helplessness expressed by Americans in recent years. The failure of the U.S. to anticipate and prevent the takeover of the Embassy rides on the Carter searches for solution to logjam crisis Commentary \ crest of a wave of similar situations in which we have failed to properly forecast and handle threats to its overseas interests. The U.S.’s failure to detect the widespread discontent and potentially explosive national mood in Iran resulted in the show of indecisiveness on how to react to the revolution. Instead of reassessing its support of the Shah in the face of increasing national opposition to his rule and realigning itself with the popular leaders, the U.S. succeeded in alienating itself from the new popular government and the Iranian people. Congressional conservatives, at the time of the revolution, argued that a more appropriate course of action would have been for the U.S. to show more effective support for the Shah, a long time U.S. ally, and to have stopped the uprising before it acquired widespread national support. In any case, the country now finds itself in a very uncomfortable situation in Iran where it is perceived as being a supporter and friend of the deposed Shah. Similar shows of our inability to detect popular discontent with a U.S. supported leader and to reassess this support occurred in Nicaragua recently when Anastasio Somoza was deposed. U.S. citizens who in their anger arid sense of frustration demanded that something be done. Many called fj>r the immediate deportation of the 50,000 Iranian students currently enrolled in U.S. universities. Well aware that the attack would further damage his deteriorating image as an effectual leader and hurt his chances for reelection, Carter opted to react with restraint and patience in order to'ensure the safety of the hostages. A military response was immediately ruled out as being impractical and dangerous. The element of surprise, essential to the success of such an operation was eliminated due to a number of factors, one being that the Embassy is located in a heavily populated inland city. Initially, Carter was assured by Iranian Prime Minister Mchdi Bazargan that he would intervene and ensure the safety and release of the hostages. However, because of his inability to work with Khomeini and the ruling clergy Bazargan resigned on Tuesday, November 6. Carter’s subsequent attempts to negotiate with Khomeini for the hostages’ release were frustrated after Khomeini rebuffed a mediation effort led by former Attorney General Ramsey Clark. 1 Public opinion ploy The Palestine Liberation Army in what is perceived by many a ploy to ingratiate American public opinion said it would attempt to negotiate with the Iranians. The PLO abandoned the talks after having been convinced by the students that the surrender of the Shah was the only way that the hostages would be released. Appeals by Pope John Paul II for the release of the hostages also proved to be to no avail. In an effort to appear to be resolute with the Iranian government rather than be a pitiful victim, Carter ordered on Nov. 12 that we halt all imports of oil from Iran. This would eliminate the use of oil as a powerful bargaining weapon by the students in the negotiations. Since the overthrow of the Shah in February 1978, the U.S. has been importing 700,000 barrels of a day. Refined products from Iran equal about 4 percent of the American supply. The embargo however, is not expected to drastically lower American supplies of oil as the oil that was to have been sold to the U.S. will be sold in the international market and will be available for purchase by American oil companies, though at a higher price. If Iran should decide to reduce world wide supplies by 4 percent, the U.S. could be in for a colder winter than anticipated. Moreover, a cutback would precipitate critical worldwide oil shortages and a significant hike in the price of a barrel of oil. The call by Carter to impose this restriction on the importation of Iranian oil will in no way serve as a punitive measure against Iran as it can easily dispose of the oil dn the market where it will in fact be demanding a greater price for the oil than was stipulated in contracts with U.S. oil companies. The action instead, is more of a symbolic move demonstrating the U.S.’s firm resolve not to submit to any form of economic pressures, rather than a practical move which would serve to coerce the students into releasing the hostages. Deteriorating image The attack on the Embassy elicited a strong emotional response among flits W^' OLD FASHIONED DUDDBBEBS i v Although Carter’s action has been greeted by wide support, many feel that Carter’s order was really nothing more than a public relations ploy. The U.S. froze all Iranian financial and property holdings in this country last Wednesday. An even more serious move might be the suspension of all farm shipments to Iran. The issue at stake is whether we should yield to blackmail and release a man Who is perceived to be a criminal by his countrymen, and acknowledged to be responsible for the murder of thousands of Iranians or hold to principles of international law and refuse to be budged by outlaw diplomacy. v j I y.'; H i * I There’s A Place For You At Hillel! Xv :v~ <»* tom via i visit Are You On Our Mailing List? I We Want You To Hear From Us! this rorrov <;ooo for a siai.it:. iki;\(ii iiutis. A AT I A 12 OX. SOFT OKIA’K I NAME: m ADDRESS: \M — — - . > ——OLD FASHION CO F-. . I Vr/Ss r/*, I — k'A Mail to 20 Squire Hall (No stamp necessary if mailed On-Campus). I. j
